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Abstract
Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to
fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle
reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper pub-
lished recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the
conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they
claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, obligations persist irrespective
of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that
due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be war-
ranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their
design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on
ability after all.
Introduction
The concept of obligation constitutes a fundamental component of social and moral cognition
[1–3]. Although there is considerable cultural variability in terms of how people understand
the content, source, and ground of obligations, anthropological evidence indicates that all
human societies deploy the concept of obligation to organise human action and interaction [4,
5]. Obligations are deemed constraints that motivate social and moral behaviours. They are
also deployed to understand and evaluate these behaviours. In particular, the non-fulfilment of
an obligation is thought to constitute wrongdoing and may warrant blame. Thus, it is difficult
to overestimate the importance of studying the folk concept of obligation.
According to a distinguished philosophical tradition that dates back at least to Kant, obliga-
tions are in force only when the persons holding them are able to fulfil them [6] (although
the depth of Kant’s commitment to the principle is debated [7]). This idea, which has been
accepted by most moral philosophers, albeit in a number of different prescriptive and descrip-
tive guises [8–10], is now widely known as the principle that “Ought Implies Can” (henceforth,
“OIC principle”). (The OIC principle is often discussed in terms of its equivalent contraposi-
tion “Inability Eliminates Obligation”, and much of our discussion will follow this trend).
Given the apparently quotidian belief that one cannot be constrained to do what one is
unable to, it is plausible to suppose that ordinary people would make judgments that are con-
sistent with the OIC principle, namely, that they would accept that one is not obligated to do
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what one is unable to. However, in a paper titled “Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment”
[11] (henceforth, IOMJ), Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri have recently presented evidence
that in fact ordinary people make judgments inconsistent with the OIC principle (see also [12],
and discussion in [13]). In their studies, participants had to read stories in which a person is
under an obligation but is subsequently described as unable to fulfil it. (IOMJ was also inter-
ested in probing whether people have more difficulty in perceiving inability when the source
of the inability is mental rather than physical, e.g. due to clinical depression. Since this issue is
tangential to the OIC principle, we leave it completely aside in this paper.) For instance, partic-
ipants in one study were asked to consider a case in which an agent (“Walter”) promises to
pick his friend (“Brown”) up from the airport (the promise creating the obligation) but later
becomes involved in a car accident and thereby rendered physically unable to keep the prom-
ise. Participants were then presented with the OIC probe, asking them to choose one of the fol-
lowing (randomly sequenced) statements:
1. Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is not physically able to do
so.
2. Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is not physically able to
do so.
3. Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is physically able to do so.
4. Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is physically able to do
so.
In this and other scenarios—varying inter alia the source of the obligation involved (e.g., a
promise or a social role), the type of inability (e.g., a physical restriction or a constraining fea-
ture of the environment), and the seriousness of the consequences of the obligation not being
fulfilled (minor or fatal)—participants overwhelmingly chose the first option: “obligated, but
not able”. On the face of it, this choice contradicts the OIC principle, since it attributes to the
individual both an obligation and the inability to fulfil it.
Moreover, to confirm that participants understood the situation as involving a literal inabil-
ity to fulfil the obligation, the studies in IOMJ included, after the OIC probe, an inability-com-
prehension probe, asking subjects whether the person under the obligation was literally unable
to fulfil it. The great majority of participants confirmed that there was literal inability, and
eliminating the few participants who denied literal inability did not change the general pattern
of the results reported in IOMJ. Thus, IOMJ concludes with the claim that “commonsense
moral cognition rejects the principle that ought implies can” [11].
The studies in IOMJ testing whether ordinary people make judgments consistent with the
OIC principle also included, after the inability-comprehension probe, a blame probe, investi-
gating whether participants would consider the individuals in their stories blameworthy for
not fulfilling their obligations. They found that the great majority of participants denied that
the individual is to blame in this respect, and suggested on the basis of this finding as well as
the results of a separate study focusing directly on the relation between blame and inability
that, for ordinary people, “Blame Implies Can”. It is important to note that the traditional view
of the relation between blame and obligation as far as inability is concerned is that the presence
of an inability undermines blame by eliminating the perception of wrongdoing—in particular,
by eliminating the perception that someone did something wrong in not fulfilling her obliga-
tion because in fact the obligation was cancelled by the inability [14, 15]. Therefore, given that
the above results indicate that the presence of an inability undermines blame without cancel-
ling the obligation (and hence without eliminating wrongdoing), IOMJ also suggests that the
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traditional view of the relation between blame and obligation does not appropriately describe
the relation between these concepts in ordinary cognition, and may be an invention of philoso-
phers trying to “validate excuses” [16].
In this paper, we question the implication of the results reported in IOMJ with new evi-
dence based on the same scenarios of inability. We argue first that there are crucial problems
with the design of IOMJ’s studies. Then, we report two studies indicating the main problem
with this design—namely, it does not seem to provide an appropriate test of whether ordinary
people reason in line with the OIC principle. Next, we provide an overview of our new studies
with an improved design. After that, we report four studies showing that the great majority of
participants make judgments compatible with the OIC principle and with the traditional view
of the relation between blame, obligation, and wrongdoing. Finally, we summarize our results
and discuss some broader issues, such as the type of reasoning involved in participants’ judg-
ments, the extent to which our results might generalize to cases involving culpable inability,
and a possible deflationary explanation of our results in terms of excuse validation.
Potential problems with IOMJ’s design
Aspects of IOMJ’s design, in particular the way in which the list of options of the OIC probe
are framed, may make the option “obligated, but not able” the sole plausible answer, though in
a way that is not inconsistent with the OIC principle.
The stories in IOMJ are characterized by an individual under an obligation who is eventu-
ally described as unable to fulfil the obligation. There is an obvious but trivial sense in which
each story, taken as a whole, involves both an obligation and an inability. The inability creates
tension with the expectation of fulfilment generated by the obligation. The option “obligated,
but not able” matches this description of the story as a whole, while the other options do not,
since they either exclude an obligation (“not obligated, and not able”) or include the ability to
fulfil the obligation (“obligated, and able”; “not obligated, but able”). Moreover, the option
“obligated, but not able” has an ordinary temporal reading (i.e., “obligated, but subsequently
not able”) that mirrors the temporal narrative of the story (i.e., an obligation is made salient
early in the story, then later an inability is made salient). This, too, renders the option “obli-
gated, but not able” the best description, because it captures the temporal dimension of the
contrast involved in the story as a whole.
In sum, according to our interpretation, when participants choose the option “obligated,
but not able”, they are not saying that the person is still under the obligation even when there
is an inability to fulfil it. That would be inconsistent with the OIC principle. Rather, they are
saying that the stories involve a contrast between a presumed obligation (made salient first)
and an inability to fulfil the obligation (made salient second). This is not inconsistent with the
OIC principle, because it may well turn out that the subjects of IOMJ’s studies would accept
the obligation for as long as they think there is ability, and reject the obligation after the inabil-
ity is made evident in the story.
There is another aspect of IOMJ’s design that may have contributed to the problem we
have outlined, and consequently to the predominant selection of the “obligated, but not able”
option. The instruction for the OIC probe (“choose the option that best applies”) implies that
there is a factually correct alternative among the options, and may suggest to participants that
they are being tested on whether they interpreted the story correctly (as if the OIC probe had
the same type of function as the inability-comprehension probe—the second probe of their
design described earlier). If participants understood the OIC probe in this way, then rather
than providing their personal opinion on the relation between the concepts of obligation and
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inability, they would simply provide the best description of what is involved in the story as a
whole, which is plausibly the option “obligated, but not able”, as discussed above.
Finally, it is important to note that none of the stories in IOMJ explicitly state the obligation
at stake in the story. In the promise scenario, the story says only that someone makes a prom-
ise; in their social-role scenarios, it says only that someone has a social role (e.g., that of a life-
guard); in another scenario, it simply describes a situation in which a small child is drowning
and there is a stranger around who could easily help the child. Thus, the participant has to
infer from the information given in the initial part of the story (i.e., from the fact that someone
made a promise, that someone has a social role, or that someone could easily help) the exis-
tence of the corresponding obligations (i.e., the obligation to keep the promise; the obligation
related to the social role; the obligation to help the drowning child). True, these inferences are
somewhat obvious, and the fact that the obligations are left implicit in the stories is not a prob-
lem in itself. However, given the aforementioned problems, it may well be that at least some
participants took the OIC probe to be a test on whether they believe that the initial situation
described in the story entails an obligation, and chose the first option to confirm that they
indeed believe that there is an obligation involved in the story.
Study 1
In this study, we test our main claim about what lead the great majority of subjects in IOMJ’s
studies to choose the “obligated, but not able” option. As we discussed above, we claim that
there is an obvious sense in which the option “obligated, but not able” is the correct answer in
the context of IOMJ’s design because of two main factors: (i) the option describes the fact that
each story as a whole involves a contrast between an obligation and an inability to fulfil the
obligation, and (ii) the option mirrors the temporal narrative of each story (i.e., an obligation
is made salient early in the story, then later an inability is made salient).
Two predictions follow from our claim. First, there would be a substantial reduction of
“obligated, but not able” responses in the results if one were to simply replace the connectives
“but” and “and” in the original options with connectives that more clearly convey the main
point of the OIC probe (i.e., that make participants focus on whether there is an inferential
relation between the concepts of obligation and ability). Second, there would also be such a
reduction if one were simply to invert the order of the obligation and inability clauses of the
original options (e.g., changing “obligated, but not able” to “not able, but obligated”), thus cre-
ating a mismatch between the order of the clauses and the temporal narrative of the story. Our
first study tests these predictions.
Method
Participants. Participants were 123 adults (56 female, 67 male; Mage = 36.84; SD = 11.19;
range = 52; 98% reporting English as their first language). Our data collection methodology
was similar to that employed in IOMJ. In all studies to be reported in this paper, participants
were recruited, tested and compensated online. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qual-
trics as the online platforms. All participants were U.S. residents. Each participant was paid
$0.50 for approximately 4 minutes of their time. Following IOMJ, in all studies we collected
around 40 responses per condition. Participants were allowed to participate in only one of the
studies (or conditions) reported in this paper.
Our research design, including the procedure for informed consent, was reviewed by the
Research Ethics Committee of the School of History and Anthropology at Queen’s University,
Belfast, UK and by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sheffield, UK. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants in all of the studies reported in this paper.
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Design, materials and procedure. The study used IOMJ’s original design of the “Walter
promise” scenario (IOMJ, Experiment 1, Physical condition), but without the question asking
whether Walter is to blame, and crucially, with three types of between-subjects OIC probes:
the original four options of IOMJ’s design as described in the introduction (Original condi-
tion); four options using “even if” and “because” as connectives, instead of “but” and “and”
(Inferential relation condition); and the original four options with the order of the obligation
and inability clauses inverted (Inverted order condition). The OIC-inconsistent and OIC-con-
sistent options of the Original, Inferential relation, and Inverted order conditions were as fol-
lows (for the sake of simplicity, we leave aside the two options where Walter was described as
able to fulfil his obligation):
1. (Original) Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is not physically
able to do so.
(Inferential relation) Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, even if Walter is
not physically able to do so.
(Inverted order) Walter is not physically able to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is
obligated to do so.
2. (Original) Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is not physi-
cally able to do so.
(Inferential relation) Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, because Walter
is not physically able to do so.
(Inverted order) Walter is not physically able to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is
not obligated to do so.
Results
The results of this study are shown in Fig 1. In the Original condition, we replicated the
results reported in IOMJ: 88% chose “obligated, but not able”, while only 12% chose “not
obligated, and not able” (N = 41). In the Inferential relation condition, we completely
reversed the results of IOMJ: only 5% chose “obligated, even if not able”, while 88% chose
“not obligated, because not able” (N = 42; 7% chose the remaining two options where Walter
is described as able). Finally, in the Inverted order condition, the two relevant options were
equally chosen: 47.5% chose “not able, but obligated” and 52.5% chose “not able, and not
obligated” (N = 40).
Confirming that there was a substantial reduction of the obligated/unable type of response
in the Inferential and Inverted conditions, Chi-square tests (with obligated/unable responses
coded as “1” and the remaining responses coded as “0”) show that these conditions differed
significantly from the Original condition: χ2 (1, 83) = 47.82, p< .01, φ = .76, for Inferential
versus Original; χ2 (1, 81) = 15.09, p< .01, φ = .43, for Inverted versus Original.
Discussion
The results of this study are consistent with our main claim about a problem with IOMJ’s
design—the subjects choosing the option “obligated, but not able” do not interpret it in a way
that is inconsistent with the OIC principle. If this option had been interpreted in terms of obli-
gated at the time of the inability, the order of the clauses should not have mattered. It is also
worth pointing out that the justifications following selections of the “obligated, but not able”
response in the Original condition strongly suggest that, with this option, the participants
were merely acknowledging that the story involved both an obligation and an inability,
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irrespective of whether the obligation is perceived to be in force subsequent to the onset of the
inability. The majority of participants provided justifications such as:
“[Walter] promised that he would pick Brown up at the airport, which gives him an obliga-
tion to pick him up, but he was injured in a serious car accident and is therefore unable to
do so.”
“He has committed to do it, and Brown is depending on him. However due to the car acci-
dent he won’t be able to make it.”
“He is obligated because he promised but he is unable to because of the accident.”
“He agreed to do it but he subsequently became physically unable.”
“He promised that he will pick up Brown at the airport. He was in an accident so he is
unable to actually carry out the task.”
Finally, the results of the Inferential relation condition, using connectives that arguably
make the point of the OIC probe more salient, suggest that ordinary people reason in a way
that is consistent with the OIC principle, at least in this type of scenario.
Fig 1. Percentage of responses consistent or inconsistent with the OIC principle in each of the three conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175206.g001
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Study 2
Although our previous study suggests that the design of IOMJ is problematic in the way we
discussed, one could still argue that (a) the Inferential relation condition merely distorted the
results due to a different logical framing of the options, that (b) the results of the Inverted order
condition do not establish directly that the response options of IOMJ’s design fail to test whether
participants reject the OIC principle, and that (c) the qualitative justifications to the “obligated,
but not able” option of the Original condition do not establish conclusively that this option is
understood in a way that is compatible with the OIC principle. In Study 4 below, we demon-
strate that the inferential relation framing does not distort the results. In this study, by asking a
follow-up question regarding the relevant response options of IOMJ’s design, we provide more
direct and conclusive evidence indicating that this design is problematic in the way we claim.
Method
Participants. Participants were 43 adults (17 female; Mage = 32.84; SD = 8.47; range = 34;
100% reporting English as their first language).
Design, materials and procedure. This study was also based on the story about Walter’s
promise with one crucial addition. We asked a clarificatory follow-up question in relation to
the options “obligated, but not able” and “not obligated, and not able”. This follow-up question
appeared on a different page, after the participant had provided a response to the original OIC
probe (see previous study). Participants choosing the “not obligated, and not able” option
were confronted with the following question (Question A):
You chose the option “Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter
is not physically able to do so.” With this choice, do you mean that Walter is no longer
under the obligation to pick up Brown at the airport after he becomes physically unable to
do so? (Yes/No)
On the other hand, participants choosing the “obligated, but not able” option had to answer
the following question (Question B):
You chose the option “Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is not
physically able to do so.” With this choice, do you mean that Walter is still under the obliga-
tion to pick up Brown at the airport after he becomes physically unable to do so? (Yes/No)
The order of the options (Yes/No) was randomized in both cases. Also in both cases, partic-
ipants responding “no” were asked to explain their choice (“Please explain what you meant,
then.”). After the follow-up question, participants answered the inability-comprehension
probe (i.e. the probe asking whether Walter was “literally unable”). We did not include a
blame probe in this study either.
The logic of this study is very simple. If the selection of the “not obligated, and not able”
option is to be taken as consistent with the OIC principle, then participants should predomi-
nantly answer “Yes” to Question A. Concomitantly, if the selection of the “obligated, but not
able” option is taken to be inconsistent with the OIC principle, then participants should pre-
dominantly answer “Yes” to Question B. To spell it out clearly: if the design and conclusions of
IOMJ are sound, then we should expect affirmative answers in both cases—but crucially so in
the case of Question B, as it is the high relative frequency with which participants selected the
“obligated, but not able” option that was interpreted as constituting the main evidence against
OIC-consistent reasoning.
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Results
The great majority of participants (74.4%) selected the option “obligated, but not able”, while
only the minority (16.3%) endorsed the option “not obligated, and not able” (the remaining
9.3% chose “obligated, and able”). As in the Original condition of the previous study, and in
IOMJ in general, the selection of the apparently OIC-inconsistent option (vs. all the other
options collectively) is significantly above chance level—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1,
43) = 10.26, p< .01, φ = 0.49. The overwhelming majority (93%) agreed that Walter is literally
unable to pick up Brown form the airport.
For the rest of the analysis, we exclude participants who denied literal inability. All 7 partici-
pants (100%) choosing the “not obligated, and not able” option answered “yes” to Question A,
confirming that their reasoning is consistent with the OIC principle. Now, 23 out of 31 partici-
pants (74%) selecting the “obligated, but not able” option said “no” in response to Question B
—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 31) = 7.26, p< .01, φ = 0.48—, indicating that, with
their response, they did not mean that Walter is still under the obligation after he becomes
physically unable to pick up Brown.
Discussion
Since the great majority of the participants choosing the “obligated, but not able” option
answered “no” to the follow-up question (Question B), our results indicate more directly and
conclusively that the selection of this option does not track OIC-inconsistent reasoning. In
other words, as we discussed above, the design of IOMJ does not seem to be appropriate to test
whether participants reject the OIC principle. The justifications of participants who chose the
“obligated, but not able” option and answered “no” to the follow-up question also support this
interpretation. Some participants were emphatic that the inability annuls the obligation, sug-
gesting that it did not even occur to them that their response could be taken as a case of obliga-
tion ascription after the accident:
“Obviously Walter is no longer obligated to pick up Brown from the airport and anyone
who tries to philosophically argue the case is limited in their scope of understanding of real-
ity. Walter agreed to pick up someone from the airport but after being severely incapaci-
tated due to a car accident he is no longer able (or obligated) to pick up the person and he
should find an alternative.”
Furthermore, many participants pointed out that, in choosing the “obligated, but not able”
option, they had intended to express the view that Walter is indeed obligated, but only up to
the point at which he becomes incapacitated, which confirms our criticism of IOMJ’s design:
“I meant that Walter was obligated to pick him up until he became physically unable to do so.”
“I meant that Walter was obligated to pick up Brown. However, once he was physically
unable to, he was no longer obligated.”
“He WAS obligated, but cannot physically do it so the obligation is no longer on him.”
“He agreed to do it, so he is obligated once he does that. But after getting hurt, he is not still
under that obligation.”
“He had agreed on picking his friend up. But when he got into a serious accident, the obli-
gation was suspended because he was no longer in the same position to help out his friend.”
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Overview of new studies
With our first two studies, we provided strong evidence that the design used in IOMJ does not
constitute an appropriate test of whether ordinary people reason in line with OIC. In the stud-
ies to follow, we utilized a design that addresses most of the aforementioned problems and
makes the task much clearer and simpler for the participants. We modified IOMJ’s design in
the following ways:
1. We changed some very trivial details of the stories to make it clearer to participants that the
characters in the stories are unable to fulfil their obligation, and/or to avoid misinterpreta-
tions of the story.
2. We changed the instructions of the OIC probe and the inability-comprehension probe to
make their different purposes obvious to participants.
3. We positioned the inability-comprehension probe before the OIC probe, that is, just after
participants read the story. And in case a participant denied that the character in the story
was literally unable to fulfil their obligation, we explained to the participant that in fact the
character was unable to do so by emphasising the relevant elements of the story; then we
asked the participant to assume that there was literal inability before answering the OIC
probe. (In our studies, hardly any participants disagreed that the character was literally
unable to fulfil their obligation and excluding these participants from the analysis changes
nothing in terms of our results and conclusions.)
4. We simplified the OIC probe by reducing its four options to two: one consistent with the
OIC principle, another inconsistent with it. (Note that the two eliminated options, which
say that the character in the story is able to fulfil her obligation, are completely irrelevant to
testing whether people make judgments consistent with the OIC principle.)
5. We phrased the two options of the OIC probe in a way that makes it clearer to participants
what the point of the OIC probe is (e.g. using the connectives “because” and “even if”
instead of “and” and “but”).
6. We included a justification probe asking participants to explain their OIC choice, in order
to gain some qualitative insight into the reasons motivating participants’ choices. (This step
was introduced after the OIC option was irreversibly selected, so there is no reason to sup-
pose that it could interfere with the quantitative results of the OIC probe).
The great majority of the above changes should not be controversial, as they merely clarify
and/or simplify the task for the participants. Although changing the connectives of the options
of the OIC probe may seem controversial, in Study 4, we demonstrate that our usage of “even
if” and “because” is not problematic.
Some of IOMJ’s studies are, arguably, much less central to testing the OIC principle (e.g.,
Experiment 7, which tests whether the difference between moral and legal obligation is rele-
vant to the principle). Accordingly, our studies focused on those studies that are most central
to the OIC principle, namely, Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 5.
Study 3: Promise
In this study, we used our new design to test whether people make judgments consistent with
the OIC principle in relation to obligations generated by promises, using the “Walter” scenario
familiar from the first two studies as well as from the first experiment in IOMJ, where it was
found that 80% of participants chose the “obligated, but not able” option, apparently contra-
dicting the OIC principle. In addition, we used different ordinary expressions that are
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commonly thought to encode the concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty”, “ought”), in order
to see whether there is variation in judgements as a result of these.
Method
Participants. Participants were 127 adults (60 female; 67 male; Mage = 33.95; SD = 11.54;
range = 53; 97% reporting English as their first language).
Design, materials and procedure. After indicating informed consent, participants read
the following story (divergences from the wording of the story as used in IOMJ are in italics):
Walter promised that he would pick up Brown from the airport. But on the day of Brown’s
flight, Walter is in a serious car accident and is hospitalized. As a result, Walter is not able to
pick up Brown at the airport.
We added “and is hospitalized” to boost the understanding that Walter is unable to pick up
Brown at the airport.
Participants were then presented with the inability-comprehension probe, whose instruc-
tion and question were as follows: “First, we would like to ask you a question to check whether
you understood the story. According to the story, is the following statement true?” The state-
ment that participants had to evaluate was: “Walter is literally unable to pick up Brown at the
airport because Walter is hospitalized”. If they answered “yes”, they were presented with the
OIC probe. If they answered “no”, they were given an explanation indicating that Water is
indeed unable to pick Brown up because his “injuries are so serious that he requires hospitali-
zation”; then they were asked to assume that this is the case before answering the OIC probe.
The instruction and question of the OIC probe were as follows: “Now, we would like to
know your personal opinion about the situation. There isn’t a correct answer here. Which
statement best reflects your personal opinion about the situation?” Participants had to choose
between two randomly sequenced statements, each consistent or inconsistent with the OIC
principle. In order to probe participants’ judgments with different ordinary expressions that
encode the concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty” or “ought”), participants were randomly
assigned to one of three phrasing conditions:
1. Under these circumstances, Walter is still obligated to (Walter still has a duty to / Walter
still ought to) pick up Brown at the airport, even if he is unable to do so.
2. Under these circumstances, Walter is not obligated to (Walter does not have a duty to / it is
not the case that Walter ought to) pick up Brown at the airport, because he is unable to do
so.
After choosing one of the above statements, participants were asked to justify their choice:
“Please explain why you marked this option”.
Finally, participants answered a blame probe, enquiring about the degree to which they
believed that Walter deserved blame for not fulfilling the obligation: “To what extent is Walter
to blame for not picking up Brown?” Participants answered this probe on a seven-point scale,
with “1” indicating “No blame”, “4” indicating “Moderate blame”, and “7” indicating “Full
blame”.
Results
Almost everyone (98%) agreed initially that Walter was literally unable to pick up Brown at
the airport. The phrasing conditions produced no effect, χ2 (2, 127) = .01, p = .99, with 100%,
98% and 100% of participants choosing the option consistent with the OIC principle in the
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“obligated”, “duty” and “ought” conditions respectively. Across the phrasing conditions, 126
out of 127 participants chose the option consistent with the OIC principle—goodness of fit
against chance: χ2 (1, 127) = 123.03, p< .01, φ = 0.98.
Blame ratings did not differ across phrasing conditions either—F(2, 124) = 1.04, p = .36. In
general, blame ratings were very low (M = 1.47; SD = 1.02), with 92 of 127 participants opting
for the “1” rating (i.e., “no blame”).
Discussion
With our improved design, we completely reversed the results of IOMJ using three ordinary
expressions that are commonly thought to encode the concept of obligation, suggesting that
there is no variation in judgement due to the examined terminological variation in this
domain.
Participants’ justifications suggest that, actually, none of their answers were inconsistent
with the OIC principle. Justifications of participants who chose the “not obligated” option
often expressed that, given the inability, it would be unintelligible to attribute an obligation, or
that it is self-evident that the obligation does not hold:
“It seems silly to say that it’s immoral to not keep a promise in extenuating circumstances
like this.”
“It makes no sense to say he should do something he isn’t able to.”
“Because he is unable to do so, it is self-explanatory.”
Sometimes they even explicated the OIC principle literally or in terms of its equivalent
contraposition:
“‘Duty’ assumes he will have the ability to implement his duty, just as a soldier is excused
from duty when injured.”
“I think that the existence of a duty presupposes the ability to fulfil that duty. If it is impossi-
ble for that duty to be fulfilled, it does not exist.”
“If someone is unable to do something they can’t be obligated to do it.”
Now, the justification of the only participant who chose the “obligated” option suggests
that, instead of making a judgment incompatible with the OIC principle, the participant sim-
ply shifted the scope of the obligation at stake:
“Walter made an agreement with full intention of keeping it and if he cannot fulfill the
agreement, notice should be sent and a proxy should be appointed to carry out the agree-
ment as specified.”
In other words, rather than maintaining that Walter is still obligated to pick up Brown at
the airport even if he is unable to do so, this participant seems to be saying that even if Walter
cannot pick Brown up, he is still obligated to do something else to improve Brown’s situation.
Since our scenario leaves open the possibility that Walter could still do something else in this
respect, the response of this participant does not necessarily conflict with the OIC principle
(this kind of justification will show up in later studies; we will refer to it as the ‘scope-shifting
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problem’, because it involves participants’ changing the scope of the obligation to include new
or alternative content).
Finally, the great amount of “no blame” answers plus the overall low mean of blame ratings
shows that participants think that Walter’s inability eliminated his blameworthiness for not
picking up Brown at the airport, which is consistent with the blame results of IOMJ. However,
contrary to IOMJ’s results, our results also suggest that participants think that the elimination
of blame was linked to the fact that Walter had no related obligation under the circumstances,
and, consequently, to the fact that Walter did not do anything wrong in not picking up Brown
at the airport. In other words, our results are more consistent with the idea that ordinary
cognition is in line with the traditional view on the relation between blame, obligation and
wrongdoing.
Study 4: Playground safety worker
Social roles are normally seen as another source of obligations. In this study, we tested whether
people make judgments consistent with the OIC principle in the context of an obligation
entailed by the social role of a playground safety worker. The scenario we utilized corresponds
to that used in the second experiment in IOMJ, where it was found that 98% (“duty” phrasing
condition) and 88% (“ought” phrasing condition) of participants chose the “obligated, but not
able” option, apparently contradicting the OIC principle. In addition, we tested whether the
framing of our options in terms of the connectives “even if” and “because” inadvertently biased
participants towards choosing the option that is consistent with the OIC principle.
Method
Participants. Participants were 86 adults (40 female, 45 male, 1 “other”; Mage = 37.67;
SD = 13.25; range = 53; 98% reporting English as their first language).
Design, materials and procedure. Participants read first the following story:
Michael is a playground safety worker. He sees some broken glass in an area where kids
sometimes play barefoot. But he is stricken by a sudden full body paralysis that immobilizes
him to the extent that he cannot even speak. As a result, Michael is not able to remove the
broken glass.
The first two modifications of the original scenario were to boost the understanding of
inability and/or to emphasize that there wasn’t anything else that Michael could have done to
improve the situation (e.g., ask other people to remove the broken glass), and thus to try to
avoid the scope-shifting problem identified in the discussion of Study 3. The last modification
replaced the verb “pick up” with the verb “remove,” which more clearly describes the content
of Michael’s obligation in this situation.
Participants were then presented with the inability-comprehension probe, which asked
them to evaluate the truth of the following statement: “Michael is literally unable to remove the
broken glass from the area because he is completely immobilized.” Depending on their truth
evaluations, participants proceeded to the OIC probe as specified in Study 3.
The instruction and question of the OIC probe were the same as previously. Since we
showed that different ordinary expressions encoding the concept of obligation do not affect
the results of the OIC probe, we used only one phrasing for the statements of the probe in
this study (“obligated”). However, participants were still randomly assigned to one of two
conditions. In the “explicit” condition, participants had to choose between the same type of
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“obligated” statements of Study 3, while in the “implicit” condition these statements were pre-
sented without the inability clauses and their connectives:
1. Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to remove the broken glass, even if he
is unable to do so (Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to remove the bro-
ken glass).
2. Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to remove the broken glass, because he
is unable to do so (Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to remove the bro-
ken glass).
We included the implicit condition in this study because one may argue (rather implausibly
in our view) that, rather than making more explicit the main point of the OIC probe, the con-
nectives “because” and “even if” inadvertently bias participants to choose the option consistent
with the OIC principle, thus distorting the results. Against this “framing” hypothesis, we pre-
dicted that there would be no effect of condition, since the fact that we asked the comprehen-
sion probe first plus the usage of “under these circumstances” and “still” already makes the
main point of the OIC probe clear enough.
After answering the OIC probe, participants answered the justification probe and the blame
probe, similarly to Study 3.
Results
Almost everyone (99%) accepted initially that Michael was literally unable to remove the bro-
ken glass. There was no effect of condition, χ2 (1, 86) = .387, p = .53, with 88% and 84% of
participants choosing the “not obligated” response in the explicit and implicit conditions,
respectively. Thus, altogether, the overwhelming majority of participants (86%) believed that
Michael did not have an obligation under the circumstances—goodness of fit against chance:
χ2 (1, 86) = 44.69, p< .01, φ = .72).
Blame ratings remained low (M = 1.79; SD = 1.41), with 59 of 86 participants opting for “no
blame”. A 2(condition) x 2(OIC option choice) between-subjects ANOVA on blame scores
revealed a main effect of option choice, F(1, 82) = 35.6, p< .01, ηp2 = .303, but no main effect
of condition (p = .17) or interaction (p = .30). Thus, participants who chose the “obligated”
option saying that Michael was obligated to remove the glass blamed him more (M = 3.67,
SD = 1.67) than participants who chose the option that he was not obligated (M = 1.49,
SD = 1.11). Accordingly, there was a significant correlation between option choice and blame
ratings: rpb = .53, p< .01.
Discussion
Once again, we completely reversed IOMJ’s results. Furthermore, as we predicted, whether the
OIC options involved the inability clauses and their connectives did not affect which option
was chosen. This indicates that an argument according to which the effect observed in Study 3
depends on our specific framing of the options, and, in particular, on the usage of the connec-
tives “even if” and “because”, is not plausible. Indeed, our results provide corroboration for
our contention that it is IOMJ’s design (rather than ours) that systematically distorts the
results.
Justifications for “not obligated” responses again showed that participants’ responses were
consistent with the OIC principle. In contrast, the justifications of the “obligated” responses
(12 in total) were more varied and, overall, did not clearly indicate that these responses were
incompatible with the OIC principle. Evincing the scope-shifting problem discussed in Study
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3, some participants seem to have shifted the scope of the obligation to the idea that Michael
still has the obligation to do (or try to do) something else to improve the situation:
“He has the job of playground safety worker, and he has been presented with an unsafe con-
dition. If he can’t remove the glass, he should call out to the kids to avoid the area, call out
to another adult, or make some kind of effort to communicate the hazard.”
“In some way if he knows there’s broken glass and no one else is notified, there needs to be
a way he can communicate with someone he can or warn the kids about it.”
Since these participants seem to have misinterpreted our scenario in that they still envisaged
that Michael could do something else, like informing other people, to improve the situation
(or since the description of our scenario does not rule out the possibility that Michael could at
least make an effort to improve the situation), their “obligated” responses are not incompatible
with the OIC principle.
Some participants seem to emphasize that Michael still has the obligation to remove the
glass, not at the time of his paralysis but rather as soon as he recovers:
“Well Michael may be unable to physically remove it himself, but he is obligated to do so in
the sense that he should remove it as soon as possible.”
“(. . .) Of course if his condition worsens or doesn’t let up then he cannot act on his obliga-
tion so he won’t clean up the glass, but with the knowledge he should do it, if he can.”
This type of justification suggests that in fact these participants accept the OIC principle.
Many participants seem to appeal to the connection between the obligation and the nature
of Michael’s social role (note that the word “responsibility” is often used in the sense of obliga-
tion related to a social role [17, 18]):
“It is still his responsibility as a playground safety worker.”
“That’s his job.”
“It’s his property. It’s his responsibility to get it cleaned up even if he can’t do it himself.”
“I believe as a worker and having knowledge makes you responsible.”
From these justifications, one may take that these participants indeed reject the OIC princi-
ple—the participants seem to believe that obligations related to social roles continue to be in
force independent of the circumstances, and hence seem to accept that Michael is still obli-
gated to remove the broken glass in that situation of inability.
However, it is still possible that these participants answered “obligated” simply to empha-
size the obligations that are normally entailed by social roles, without necessarily rejecting the
OIC principle. Because social roles are deemed to entail obligations, there is a sense in which
the entailed obligations do not disappear in cases of inability, since the social role does not dis-
appear with the inability (a playground safety worker does not cease to be a playground safety
worker just because he is unable to fulfil his role in a specific situation). Accordingly, people
may make a distinction between obligations that are normally entailed by a social role, and
obligations that are in force at a specific point in time. This would make it possible for a
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playground safety worker qua playground safety worker to have an obligation to remove the
broken glass, and yet this particular paralysed playground safety worker to not have that obli-
gation. Thus, the above participants may be interpreting and answering the OIC probe simply
in terms of the obligations that are normally entailed by a social role, in which case their
responses are not necessarily inconsistent with the OIC principle, given that this principle has
generally been assumed to be concerned with whether an obligation is still in force at the time
of the inability. (It is important to note that this issue, which may have also prompted partici-
pants to choose the “obligated but not able” option in the related studies of IOMJ, is different
from the main criticism we delineated concerning the way this option is framed: even in the
sense of a social-role obligation being in force, there is a trivial sense in which an obligation is
involved in the story and leads one to choose the option “obligated but not able”.)
Finally, the large number of “no blame” answers and low mean of blame ratings, along with
the positive correlation between these ratings and OIC responses (i.e., more blame, more “obli-
gated” response) is more consistent with the idea that ordinary cognition is in line with the tra-
ditional view of the relation between blame, obligation, and wrongdoing.
Study 5: Lifeguard
In this study, we tested whether people make judgments consistent with the OIC principle,
again in the context of an obligation entailed by a social role, but this time that of a lifeguard.
While studies 3 and 4 involved an “internal” inability coming from physical restrictions, this
study involves an “external” inability coming from constraints of the environment like dis-
tance in space. Furthermore, while studies 3 and 4 involved relatively minor consequences like
not being picked up at the airport or stepping on broken glass, this study involves a life-and-
death situation. The scenario we utilized corresponds to the one in IOMJ’s fourth experiment,
where it was found that 93% of participants chose the “obligated, but unable” option that
apparently contradicts the OIC principle.
Method
Participants. Participants were 42 adults (11 female, 31 male; Mage = 38.98; SD = 13.13;
range = 49; 98% reporting English as their first language).
Design, materials and procedure. Participants read the following story:
Jessica is the only lifeguard at a remote ocean beach. Two struggling swimmers are about to
drown, and no one else is around except Jessica. She rushes in to save them, but because of
the great distance between the swimmers, it is physically impossible for her to rescue both
swimmers. Jessica rescues one swimmer but not the other.
The main modifications of the original scenario were again introduced in order to boost
the understanding of inability and/or to emphasize that there wasn’t anything else that Jessica
could have done to improve the situation (e.g., ask for additional help). (Other minor stylistic
modifications, not indicated here, were also introduced to improve readability).
The rest of the procedure was exactly the same as in studies 3 and 4: inability-comprehen-
sion probe (“Jessica is literally unable to rescue both swimmers because they are too far
apart”); OIC probe with justification probe; blame probe. In this study, there was only one
OIC probe condition, with the following options:
1. Under these circumstances, Jessica is still obligated to rescue both swimmers, even if she is
unable to do so.
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2. Under these circumstances, Jessica is not obligated to rescue both swimmers, because she is
unable to do so.
Results
Almost everyone (95%) agreed that Jessica was literally unable to save both swimmers. The
great majority (79%) of participants felt that the agent was not obligated to save both swim-
mers—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 42) = 13.71, p< .01, φ = 0.57.
Blame scores remained relatively low (M = 1.67; SD = 1.18), with 28 of 42 participants opt-
ing for “no blame”. However, in contrast with the previous study, participants choosing the
“obligated” option did not ascribe significantly more blame to Jessica than participants choos-
ing the “not obligated” one: t(40) = 1.64, p = .21, d = .49 (“obligated”: M = 2.11; SD = 1.45; “not
obligated”: M = 1.55; SD = 1.09). Accordingly, there was no significant correlation between
option choice and blame ratings: rpb = .19, p = .21.
Discussion
Yet again, in sharp contrast to the findings in IOMJ, the “not obligated” option was clearly pre-
ferred, even in a case in which the consequences are severe (the death of a swimmer).
Moreover, again, while the justifications of the “not obligated” responses show that these
responses were consistent with the OIC principle, the justifications of “obligated” responses (9
in total) did not clearly indicate that these responses were incompatible with the OIC principle.
The great majority of “obligated” responses evinced the scope-shifting problem, in this case
insisting that Jessica had a further obligation to try to save both swimmers:
“Even if she thinks and it would be physically impossible, she should still make as much of
an effort as possible to try to save both swimmers.”
“She should still make an attempt to do whatever she can do.”
“It is her employment obligation to at least attempt to rescue both. One at a time.”
“She should at least try to save them since we don’t know if she can fail or not.”
“It is her duty as a lifeguard to do the best she can with what she has. Despite her being
unable to rescue both people, she has to be moral enough to try to save both.”
Since our scenario does not rule out the possibility that Jessica can try to save both swim-
mers, these justifications show that the related responses are not incompatible with the OIC
principle.
Again, some participants seemed to appeal to the connection between the obligation and
the nature of Jessica’s social role:
“The conditions of the rescue could change however her job as a lifeguard does not change”
“She was the only one there, it was her job.”
As we discussed in Study 2, these justifications may indicate real rejection of the OIC prin-
ciple. Alternatively, similarly to what we suggested, they may indicate that, with their “obli-
gated” response, the participants are simply emphasising the defeasible obligation that is
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entailed by the social role of a lifeguard, without yet accepting that the obligation was in force
in that specific situation—that is, without rejecting the OIC principle.
Finally, although the positive correlation between blame ratings and OIC option choices
was not statistically significant, the large number of “no blame” answers and low mean of
blame ratings are still more consistent with the view that ordinary cognition aligns with the
traditional view of the relation between blame, obligation, and wrongdoing.
Study 6: Drowning child
Our first three studies featured obligations created either by the agent through a social action
(a promise), or by the social role of the agent (safety worker, lifeguard). In this final study, we
feature a case in which the obligation does not come from a promise or a social role, but from
the situation—a drowning child creating an obligation to help. The scenario corresponds to
that in a particular condition (“recent”) of IOMJ’s fifth experiment, where it was found that
88% of participants chose the “obligated, but unable” option that apparently contradicts the
OIC principle.
Method
Participants. Participants were 41 adults (12 female, 29 male; Mage = 37.29; SD = 12.00;
range = 42; 100% reporting English as their first language).
Design, materials and procedure. Participants first read the following story:
Michael is relaxing in the park near a pond when he sees a small girl fall in. She is drowning
and definitely will die unless someone quickly pulls her out. This part of the park is secluded
and Michael is the only person around. But Michael is stricken by a sudden full body paraly-
sis. As a result, Michael is not able to save the girl.
We used “full body paralysis” instead of the original “leg paralysis” on the premise that this
phrasing would be perceived as more of an incapacitating condition, and also as an attempt to
preclude the scope-shifting problem (in a pilot study using the scenario with “leg paralysis”, a
participant with an “obligated” response suggested that Michael should “at least try to crawl to
save the girl”).
The rest of the procedure was the same as in the previous studies: comprehension probe
(“Michael is literally unable to save the small girl because he is completely paralyzed”); OIC
probe with justification probe; blame probe. As in Study 5, there was only one OIC probe con-
dition, with the following two options:
1. Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to save the small girl, even if he is
unable to do so.
2. Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to save the small girl, because he is
unable to do so.
Results
Almost all participants (98%) agreed that Michael was literally unable to save the girl. The
great majority of participants (73%) thought that Michael was not obligated when there was
an inability to fulfil the obligation—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 41) = 8.80, p< .01,
φ = .46.
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Although “no blame” was still the modal rating (18 out of 41 participants), blame scores
were noticeably higher in this study (M = 2.73; SD = 2.1). For example, a t-test revealed that
the blame scores in Study 5 and Study 6 differed significantly, t(61) = 2.84, p< .01, d = 0.72
(equality of variances not assumed). Moreover, a t-test showed that, similarly to Study 4 (but
unlike in Study 5), blame scores were significantly higher for participants choosing the “obli-
gated” option than for those choosing the “not obligated” option: t(39) = 5.15, p< .01, d = 1.65
(“obligated”: M = 4.91; SD = 2.02; “not obligated”: M = 1.93; SD = 1.48). Finally, there was a
strong, significant correlation between statement choice and blame ratings: rpb = .64, p< .01.
Discussion
We again reversed the results of IOMJ, although, of the four studies, this one had the lowest
percentage of “not obligated” responses.
However, an analysis of the justifications of “obligated” responses (11 in total) suggests that
this study was beset by a major problem. About half of the participants do not seem to have
maintained the assumption of literal inability when answering the OIC probe, mostly because
they took the full bodily paralysis to be a controllable emotional reaction (involving especially
fear):
“He needs to overcome his fear and save the girl.”
“You have to overcome your fear a person’s life is at stake.”
“It was just an emotional reaction which he could overcome.”
“Michael is responsible to get control of himself and save the girl. He can control his emo-
tion and reactions and needs to pull himself together.”
“He is responsible to save her even if he SEEMS unable to do it. I believe his perception of
being paralyzed is not real.”
If these justifications indeed correspond to the reason why participants chose the “obli-
gated” response, then their responses are not inconsistent with the OIC principle after all.
Some participants’ responses revealed the scope-shifting problem again in terms of obliga-
tion to try, which, as we already discussed, is not incompatible with the OIC principle:
“He is obligated to at least TRY. If he can’t, he can’t. Maybe the water is deep and he can’t
swim. But he should at least try no matter what.”
“I have never heard of a sudden full body paralysis like this, and it seems like Michael
should still be trying to help.”
A few participants emphasized that there was a (moral) obligation in the situation:
“He had a duty to act, a moral obligation. His fear paralyzed him and he was unable to act.”
“He is morally obligated to save the girl.”
“Well I assume nothing has changed about the girls [sic] situation just because Michael
can’t move so the obligation to save her is still there, even if he can’t move it still exists.”
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These justifications seem indeed to indicate a response that is inconsistent with the OIC
principle.
The fact that the overall mean of blame ratings was a bit higher in this study (in comparison
with studies 4 and 5) is not incompatible with the view that inability undermines blame,
since the mean was substantially affected by the ratings of the participants with “obligated”
responses that did not assume inability as shown by their justifications (with these participants
eliminated from the analysis, the overall blame mean drops from “2.73” to “2.25”, which is
much closer to, and non-significantly different from, the overall mean of studies 4 and 5).
Moreover, a large number of participants still chose the “no blame” answer. Finally, these
blame ratings plus the strong correlation between blame ratings and OIC choice indicate that
ordinary cognition is in line with the traditional view of the relation between blame, obliga-
tion, and wrongdoing.
General discussion and conclusion
In studies 1 and 2, we provided evidence indicating that there is a problem with IOMJ’s
research design, namely that it does not unambiguously test whether people reason in line
with the OIC principle. In the following four studies, using an improved design, we showed
that the great majority of participants judge that a person is not under an obligation if she is
not able to fulfil it, completely reversing the results of IOMJ (see Fig 2). Study 3 showed that
the obligation to fulfil a promise is deemed annulled when the agent is not able to fulfil it. This
study also indicates that this is the case irrespective of the particular term used to express the
concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty” or “ought”). Using a different scenario, Study 4 dem-
onstrated that these results do not depend on our particular use of connectives—rather, it is
the results of IOMJ that appear fragile in this respect, as also shown in Study 1. Studies 5 and 6
extended these findings to cases in which the consequences are more serious (the death of a
person).
Studies 4, 5, and 6 still saw a relevant minority of participants choosing the “obligated”
response, suggesting that there may be some individual variation in this domain. However, a
substantial part of “obligated” responses still seems to derive from a misinterpretation of the
OIC probe and/or the scenarios, as evinced by justifications demonstrating the “scope-shift-
ing” problem, which appeared across all studies, by justifications showing that the participants
did not keep the assumption of inability, which appeared in Study 6, and by justifications that
seemed simply to emphasize the obligations normally entailed by social roles, which appeared
in studies 4 and 5. Of course, if this is correct, it raises the question as to why there was such
misinterpretation. The scope-shifting problem may be a result of participants’ inclination to
blame the person specifically for not trying to do her best to minimize the bad consequences of
the situation, something our studies did not control for. The misinterpretation of “full body
paralysis” in terms of controllable emotional reaction in Study 6 may have a similar explana-
tion. An interpretation of the OIC probe in terms of whether the obligations are entailed by
the social role (instead of in terms of the entailed obligations being in force) may be difficult to
avoid completely in contexts involving social roles, since this may always be a possible reading
of the question.
Moreover, one may raise the question of why there may have been an increase in misinter-
pretation between Study 3 and Study 6 correlated with the increase in “obligated” responses.
There is a sense in which the consequence of scenario 6 (the death of a small girl) is worse than
that of scenario 5 (the death of an adult), which in turn is worse than that of Study 5 (the risk
stepping on a broken glass), which in turn is worse than that of Study 3 (not being picked
up at the airport). (A small study asking participants to rate these scenarios in terms of their
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seriousness confirmed this hierarchy—N = 25, Kendall’s W = .78, p< .01). Thus, it is also pos-
sible that this increase in seriousness may have contributed to the increase in the amount of
misinterpretation from scenario 3 to 6, by pushing participants to see the situation as less
determined and hence to be more hopeful about a positive outcome.
If our take on the minority responses is correct, the range of individual variation suggested
by our sample is rather small—almost all participants make judgements consistent with the
OIC principle in the types of scenarios that we probed. This raises two broader and comple-
mentary issues. The first issue concerns the type of reasoning involved in participants’ judg-
ments—in particular, the type of implication connecting the concepts of obligation and ability.
The second issue concerns the generalizability of our results to different types of contexts—in
particular, to contexts involving culpable inability [19, 20]. We discuss these two issues in turn.
Since implication can take many forms, the general statement of the OIC principle under-
specifies the nature of the inferential relationship between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. In the philosophi-
cal literature, the usual candidates for this relationship are presupposition [21], conversational
implicature [22], pragmatic-logical inference [23], and conceptual or analytic entailment [10,
24]. This issue is important because each account of implication (insofar as they are under-
stood as hypotheses about ordinary cognition) will entail different predictions about people’s
judgments. For instance, because on the conceptual-entailment account the inference is logi-
cally necessary, attributions of inability (to X at time Y) would preclude attributions of obliga-
tion (to X at time Y) across all types of context. In contrast, because on the conversational-
implicature account the inference is defeasible, attributions of inability would preclude
Fig 2. Percentage of responses to the OIC probe in studies 3, 4, 5 and 6.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175206.g002
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attributions of obligation in some contexts but not in others. The homogeneity of our results is
consistent with any of these accounts—e.g., it may be that our participants reasoned in terms
of conceptual entailment or it may be that they reasoned in terms of conversational implica-
ture, but our studies were limited to contexts where the implicature is not cancelled. Accord-
ingly, our results raise doubts about the claims made in IOMJ, whatever interpretation of
implication the authors may have in mind (Buckwalter and Turri are not explicit in their arti-
cle about whether they have a specific version of the OIC principle in mind). However, some
results in the literature related to contexts of culpable inability suggest that at least the concep-
tual-entailment account is not correct, which leads us to the second issue.
In order to probe whether ordinary people reject the OIC principle in terms of the concep-
tual-entailment account, Chituc et al. [19] presented participants with two types of scenarios
of inability. Some scenarios (“low-blame scenarios”) were similar to those of our studies in
that their main character did not have control (or had little control) over the source of the
inability (e.g., one could not fulfil a promise because one’s car broke down unexpectedly). In
relation to these scenarios, Chituc et al. obtained results that were overall similar to ours (i.e.,
the majority of participants gave responses consistent with the OIC principle), which provides
further evidence in favour of our claim that IOMJ’s conclusions are problematic.
However, the other scenarios (“high-blame scenarios”) differ from those of our studies in
that their main character had total control over the source of the inability (in fact, the inability
was intentionally created by the character himself). In their first experiment, for example, par-
ticipants were presented with the following vignette:
Adams promises to meet his friend Brown for lunch at noon today. It takes Adams thirty
minutes to drive from his house to the place where they plan to eat lunch together. Adams
decides that he does not want to have lunch with Brown after all, so he stays at his house
until eleven forty-five. Because of where he is at that time, Adams cannot meet his friend
Brown at noon, as he promised. [19]
Participants were then asked whether they agree with the statement “At eleven forty-five, it
is still true that Adams ought to meet Brown at noon,” which they answered by choosing a
point on a scale from -50 (“completely disagree”) to 50 (“completely agree”), with 0 as the mid-
point (“neither agree nor disagree”). In this condition, 60% of participants provided a response
inconsistent with the OIC principle (i.e., answered above the midpoint). Moreover, in their
third experiment, they obtained a similar result using a different high-blame vignette (50% of
participants provided OIC-inconsistent responses in this new condition). With these results
(and others to be discussed below), Chituc et al. claim that the conceptual-entailment account
cannot be correct.
Although our studies did not address high-blame contexts, we would like to make two com-
ments about Chituc et al.’s related results. First, as the qualitative data of our studies show,
participants are prone to misinterpreting the scenarios and/or the OIC probe in a way that
renders their OIC-inconsistent responses of questionable value as evidence concerning
whether they reject the OIC principle. Now, it is possible that this tendency to misinterpreta-
tion was even more accentuated in Chituc et al.’s high-blame scenarios, given that their cases
of self-imposed inability are somewhat bizarre from the perspective of the protagonist’s behav-
iour (making a decision to self-impose an inability after making a promise to a friend without
even notifying them). Thus, we believe that one has to be cautious about whether Chituc
et al.’s high-blame results demonstrate that the conceptual-entailment account is incorrect (for
a detailed discussion of cases of self-imposed inability from the perspective of the conceptual-
entailment account, see [24]).
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Second, even supposing that Chituc et al.’s studies indeed reveal that ordinary people reject
the OIC principle qua conceptual entailment, it is still plausible to suppose that there is a very
stable inferential relation between the concepts of obligation and ability—i.e. that the OIC
implication is a core element of the set of inferential relations normally associated with the folk
concept of obligation. Ordinary people seem to understand obligations as having a behavior-
regulating role—i.e., obligations are deemed social or moral constraints on actions [2, 3].
Accordingly, it would seem rather incoherent to think that such a constraint should still be in
force when it cannot be effective, namely, when the action in question cannot be carried out
(for a similar argument, see [23]). Cases of self-imposed inability may simply constitute excep-
tions to this. A brief consideration of the literature on concepts in the cognitive sciences may
help convey our main point here [25–27]. Although the inferential relation between the con-
cepts of obligation and ability may not be analytical (à la the classical theory of concepts), it
may be prototypical (à la prototype theories) and/or it may be part of a folk theory delineating
the role of obligations (à la the theory view of concepts).
We turn now to the discussion of our blame results and of our perspective on how ordi-
nary people understand the relation between blame, obligation/wrongdoing, and inability.
In all our studies, a large number of participants attributed no blame to the individual for the
fact that the obligation was not fulfilled. The mean blame ratings were low in all studies too.
They were highest in Study 6, but this was likely due to the fact that some participants did
not maintain the assumption of inability appropriately. Thus, overall, our results suggest
that, for ordinary people, inability undermines blame, which is consistent with the results in
IOMJ on blame. Contrary to the claim made in IOMJ that blame attributions are unrelated
to obligation attributions, the low percentage of the “obligated” responses plus the correla-
tions between blame ratings and OIC probe choices (i.e., more blame, more “obligated”
responses) in our results are consistent with our hypothesis that ordinary cognition is in line
with the traditional view that, in cases of inability, blame reduction is mediated by obliga-
tion/wrongdoing elimination.
However, there is another set of results in Chituc et al. [19] that apparently goes against
our perspective on how ordinary people understand the relation between blame, obligation/
wrongdoing, and inability—indeed, these results apparently go even against the aforemen-
tioned hypothesis that, even if not analytical, the OIC implication is a core element of the set
of inferential relations normally associated with the folk concept of obligation. (This is some-
thing that is not explicit in Chituc et al.’s discussion: while some of their results, as discussed
above, go against the conceptual-entailment account of the OIC implication but not necessar-
ily against other accounts, some of their results, to be discussed next, go against a much
broader range of accounts.)
In their second experiment, Chituc included only a low-blame scenario of inability (in this
scenario, the character cannot keep the promise to meet with his colleague at noon because his
car unexpectedly breaks down). They asked participants how much they agreed with state-
ments saying that the character ought to keep the promise, is to blame for not keeping the
promise, and can keep the promise (the same agreement scale was used, as explained before in
relation to their first experiment). Restricting the analysis to participants who disagreed with
the “can” statement, since these are the relevant cases for our discussion, Chituc et al. found a
correlation between blame and obligation responses (r = .24, p< .01), but while they found a
correlation between blame and ability responses (r = .24, p< .01), they did not find a correla-
tion between obligation and ability responses (r = .07, p = .37). This suggests that when people
give OIC-consistent responses, they are simply engaging in excuse validation [16]—i.e., they
are denying obligation to be consistent with a primary reduction in blame attribution based on
the situation of inability, rather than because of an inferential relation between the concepts of
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obligation and ability. In other words, it suggests that the relation between obligation and abil-
ity is completely mediated by blame attributions.
However, the above pattern of correlations was not replicated in their Experiment 3 in the
context of its moral/unable conditions, since they did not found a correlation between blame
and ability responses while observing a trend (r = .18, p = .09) between obligation and ability
responses. (It is worth noting that the non-moral conditions of Chituc et al.’s Experiment 3 are
completely irrelevant to our issue here, since these conditions do not involve non-moral obli-
gations as Chituc et al. appear to claim; rather they involve what is discretionary—a decision
to go to the cinema does not involve a non-moral obligation, it simply involves what is under
someone’s discretion.) Furthermore, we carried out further analyses of the results of Experi-
ment 3 (based on Supplementary Data S4 available at the publisher’s website), showing that
the relevant correlations go in the direction of our picture. (The following correlations were
not reported in the original article.) If one restricts the analysis to participants who disagreed
with the “can” statement (thus including only those subjects whose responses are mostly rele-
vant to our discussion), one finds that there is a correlation between blame and obligation
responses (r = .40, p< .01), but while there is still no correlation between blame and ability
responses (r = .03, p = .79), there is a correlation between obligation and ability responses
(r = .32, p< .01). Thus, although we acknowledge that this is still a contentious issue, and
that it is still possible that our results were prompted by an excuse-validation bias, we believe
that our overall picture on the relation between blame, obligation/wrongdoing and inability
remains plausible.
To conclude, our studies provide strong evidence that despite IOMJ’s claims to the con-
trary, people do make judgements largely compatible with the OIC principle, at least in cases
in which the inability is not self-imposed. Furthermore, although we acknowledge that this
question is far from settled, we believe that our results are best explained by maintaining that
there exists a strong inferential relation between the concepts of obligation and ability in folk
cognition. Finally, our results are consistent with the idea that ordinary reasoning is in line
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